Dmitry Tymchuk’s Military Blog: Summary – April 14, 2014
Translated and edited by Voices of Ukraine
Brothers and sisters,
Here’s the Summary for April 14, 2014.
The bad news
1. The extremists are continuing to wreak havoc in eastern Ukraine. The government continues to issue ultimatums but no one reacts to them. It’s the opposite: the extremists started issuing their own ultimatums, as happened in Luhansk today – they demanded that the oblast [regional] authorities do not submit to Kyiv.
I have talked about this, let me reiterate it once again: nothing provokes violence more than an unwillingness to protect oneself. The more frequently our government issues ultimatums, and then does nothing, the more scepticism their threats will receive. Today’s “suggestion” by Turchynov to conduct a joint anti-terrorism operation with the peacekeeping forces of the UN – is, as a matter of fact, a statement by Ukrainian authorities about their own powerlessness.
If we hadn’t found out that the very same Turchynov finally signed the decree on the start of anti-terrorist operations (ATO), I would have said: guys, they’re pouring Ukraine down the drain. But not all is lost. At least, we would like to belive in this, although everything is happening with a brutal and criminal delay.
2. The Kremlin has announced that “there are very many complaints coming from the eastern regions of Ukraine, addressed personally to Putin, asking for help.”
Everyone perfectly understands what Russian “aid” smells like. Why these statements are being publicized – is understood equally well too.
In the case of Crimea, Putin has retroactively invented “opinion poll data,” which allegedly showed the desire of Crimean residents to become part of Russia. Saying that is why he started the aggression. Now, Moscow is trying to create an excuse ahead of time for its invasion of the eastern regions.
3. Information regarding our 25th Separate Airborne Brigade. Today, Russian media reported that the brigade joined the extremists in Sloviansk.
That’s not true. The brigade did not join anyone’s side.
The truth is that there were problems with its use in the anti-terrorist operation. Unfortunately, we cannot provide details yet. But it’s not even close to treason.
4. The Party of Regions called on Ukrainian soldiers to stop following “illegal orders by the current government.”
I have no words in regards to this statement – only, as people say, spit and filthy language. Following orders, and under the patronage of these nasty hypocrites, “law enforcement personnel” shot unarmed people who stood for democracy under the flags of Ukraine just two months ago on Maidan (and by the way, they rushed headlong to Kyiv to participate as army execution units – Maidan won just in time).
Now they are broadcasting about “criminal orders” when it comes to Russian aggressors and armed terrorists who are committing extremist acts under the Russian flag.
In my opinion, until we clean out this evil scum from government offices and parliamentary seats, it is too early to speak about a free Ukraine.
The good news:
1. The meeting of the UN Security Council showed that no one believes Russia anymore. At the same time, the EU leaders declared their readiness to adopt new sanctions against Russia next week. The United States announced their readiness to do so on their end, and earlier at that – starting tomorrow.
The fact of the matter is: Russia became the world’s pariah. Everyone recognized the face of the new Reich. The only question remains, how ready is the world to radically solve the problem named “Putin.”
2. It’s taken too long and it’s very sad, but nonetheless, special forces units are being deployed to eastern Ukraine.
I get this impression that [the officials in] Kyiv do not quite understand that the clock is ticking. But even so, the process is underway. And at the moment, they have convened rather impressive forces. The only question is who will coordinate them and how.
3. However, this question has been answered already: the order regarding the start of an ATO [anti-terrorist operation] has finally been signed. Moreover, Vasyl Krutov has been appointed the First Deputy Head of the SBU and the Head of the Antiterrorism Center at the SBU. He has already been dubbed as “a legend of the ‘Alpha’ special forces” in the media. It is also good to see that the old guard returns alongside Krutov.
The special forces are confident that this General and his guys will be able to plan and organize a relatively efficient operation. Let’s hope so – because it seems to be the last hope to save the East within Ukraine.
Tuesday, April 15, 2014
Friday, March 14, 2014
In the Navy: A former Naval officer weighs in on the Black Sea Fleet
In response to a recent post on Jalopnik's Foxtrot Alpha blog, I asked a friend who had served in the Navy for over a decade to weigh in on the conflict. He'd spent significant amounts of time in Georgia and in the Crimea on joint exercises, so I felt that he'd give a perspective missing from the news. Here are his responses, edited by me.
I spent a good deal of time in the Crimea - including a port visit at the base in Sevastopol described in the article. I was there in 2010 when things were a bit different, but the difficulties of the completely enclosed Black Sea and mass of anti-surface missiles that could be brought to bear are accurately described. I do think the article downplays the fact that if there was a shooting war between us and Russia, the tactical difficulties of the Black Sea would be the least of our problems. The issue here is that those difficulties do create a credible threat of access denial and aversion to warfare and further involvement in the region.
When I was there, our concern was not so much Russia as an energy but rather tackling narcotics trafficking that provided most of the Taliban's revenue. Our mission focused on cooperative training to bolster the ability of Black Sea states to combat said trafficking. That said, if Russia also has concerns about revenue/capabilities of Central Asian terrorist elements, a strong Russian Black Sea fleet might actually help in that respect.
While the news is focusing on naval competition between the US and Russia, we also have some recent examples of cooperation, notably between US/Russian naval units conducting anti-piracy in East Africa. While Putin has the capability to shut down the Black Sea, and as alluded, we have the capacity for preemptive strike by air assets against an aging fleet. Neither side could do those things without starting a war that in all likelihood would escalate very quickly and very badly. Additionally, anti-surface cruise missiles, especially in restricted and heavily trafficked areas, have a tendency to track on background shipping (as seen in Lebanon 2006). In the strategic seaway of the Bosporus and Black Sea in general, based purely on numbers/flags/locations of merchant vessels these days, that means a strong probability that any massive missile attack in the Black Sea would sink Chinese or Indian merchant vessels - putting Russia in a very awkward position.
Long and convoluted response, but it's a complicated issue - the main point being Russia has the advantage of a strong position but the disadvantage of being unable to use it without large scale warfare or economic ruin.
Lastly, going back to why I was there, I realize it's not politically feasible now, but given that our interests in the region (maritime security, counter narcotics/human trafficking) may actually align with Russia's own, the way ahead would be sending out feelers about Black Sea security exercises and training with all Black Sea naval powers INCLUDING Russia, stressing that our recent collaboration (Somali Pirate Ops) makes us both logical exercise planners - sounds bizarre, but there's actually more Naval Diplomacy between us and Russia than it might seem.
I do believe firmly though that all the talk of issues on US/Russian naval balance ignore that open warfare between the US and Russia anywhere would be unwinnable by either side (but both would lose big).
I spent a good deal of time in the Crimea - including a port visit at the base in Sevastopol described in the article. I was there in 2010 when things were a bit different, but the difficulties of the completely enclosed Black Sea and mass of anti-surface missiles that could be brought to bear are accurately described. I do think the article downplays the fact that if there was a shooting war between us and Russia, the tactical difficulties of the Black Sea would be the least of our problems. The issue here is that those difficulties do create a credible threat of access denial and aversion to warfare and further involvement in the region.
When I was there, our concern was not so much Russia as an energy but rather tackling narcotics trafficking that provided most of the Taliban's revenue. Our mission focused on cooperative training to bolster the ability of Black Sea states to combat said trafficking. That said, if Russia also has concerns about revenue/capabilities of Central Asian terrorist elements, a strong Russian Black Sea fleet might actually help in that respect.
While the news is focusing on naval competition between the US and Russia, we also have some recent examples of cooperation, notably between US/Russian naval units conducting anti-piracy in East Africa. While Putin has the capability to shut down the Black Sea, and as alluded, we have the capacity for preemptive strike by air assets against an aging fleet. Neither side could do those things without starting a war that in all likelihood would escalate very quickly and very badly. Additionally, anti-surface cruise missiles, especially in restricted and heavily trafficked areas, have a tendency to track on background shipping (as seen in Lebanon 2006). In the strategic seaway of the Bosporus and Black Sea in general, based purely on numbers/flags/locations of merchant vessels these days, that means a strong probability that any massive missile attack in the Black Sea would sink Chinese or Indian merchant vessels - putting Russia in a very awkward position.
Long and convoluted response, but it's a complicated issue - the main point being Russia has the advantage of a strong position but the disadvantage of being unable to use it without large scale warfare or economic ruin.
Lastly, going back to why I was there, I realize it's not politically feasible now, but given that our interests in the region (maritime security, counter narcotics/human trafficking) may actually align with Russia's own, the way ahead would be sending out feelers about Black Sea security exercises and training with all Black Sea naval powers INCLUDING Russia, stressing that our recent collaboration (Somali Pirate Ops) makes us both logical exercise planners - sounds bizarre, but there's actually more Naval Diplomacy between us and Russia than it might seem.
I do believe firmly though that all the talk of issues on US/Russian naval balance ignore that open warfare between the US and Russia anywhere would be unwinnable by either side (but both would lose big).
Wednesday, March 5, 2014
Guest Post for Anthropoliteia: the anthropology of policing
A guest blog post for Anthropoliteia
Text below, for all the funky pictures go to the original post.
Much of what has been fascinating in Ukraine has been how perceptions of public order have framed interpretations of this conflict. The Maidan protesters certainly wrote another chapter in the ‘how to topple a corrupt government’ handbook that is, from the Russian perspective, far more dangerous than any particular nationalist regime might be. If unrest rises in Russia and a viable protest movement emerges (think motorcycle helmets and molotovs, not signs and chants), they will look to the experience of Maidan. The escalation of the conflict was, from the Russian perspective, something that should never have had to happen. Like in Kazakhstan (google Zhanaozen ) or Uzbekistan (Andijan), autocrats tend to stomp open dissent out before it can morph into something autonomous like Maidan. These suppressions as a rule occur off the books and without further inquiry. Yet it is precisely this idea of accountability that drove Yanukovch from Ukraine (that, along with an awkward telephone call from Putin).
The crucial factor in Ukraine was the sudden “disappearance” of the elected president, Viktor Yanukovych, which created a perceived power vacuum that Russia acted on. Youtube is filled with videos of Russian politicians and unnamed agitators handing out wads of cash, and evidence exists that a core group of pro-Russian “victims” have been bussed around the country and performed the same skit for the cameras. (*editor’s note: you can find a clearinghouse for fake information here)
I don’t want to get into geopolitics, so I’ll try to keep as close to the ground as possible. In situations in which Russia military or irregular forces (armed volunteers, Cossacks, etc.) intervenes, it does so not to achieve a decisive victory but to keep the de jure sovereign at bay. This happened in Moldova during the 1992 war between Transnistria/Russia and Moldova. The conflict began when locals loyal to separatists began taking over the tangible instruments of Moldovan state power — police stations and government buildings. This is happening in Crimiea too, except instead of the police it is Ukrainian military/naval installations. Next, the ill-defined borders of the emerging polity will be fortified and later codified to some degree through negotiations. There is a reason that bunkers and checkpoints suddenly proliferated, and that airports and the ferry terminal at Kerch were taken over. These facilitate not only the movement of troops and arms, but serve to filter unwanted individuals from entering. The new Ukrainian government has no means of entering, much less controlling Crimea. Its only loyal forces are in a standoff with local irregulars and the Russian army. The longer this goes on, the more likely it is that violence will occur and the response will be swift. Ukraine has a long history of guerrilla warfare against outsiders perceived as threatening to the nation (Poles, Germans, Russians), and ethnic cleansing.
This situation in which the de jure sovereign is kept at bay emboldens locals and otherwise marginal politicians who now take the stage as true leaders. The leader of the Crimean separatists, Sergey Aksyonov, led a party that received only 4% of votes in the last elections. His only biography of note is his criminal one. By diminishing Ukraine’s sovereignty, Crimean separatists and their patrons in the Kremlin will be able to create a prolonged period of uncertainty in which their original claims of discrimination and violence will shift from fantasy to reality. Ukraine’s fledgling government will be increasingly forced to look at declaring martial law (the Russian term is Военное положение, which roughly translated as war situation) and further creating uncertainty insofar as their legal claims to be the rightful successor government have already been questioned and undermined by Russia. The Russian state has shown that provocations and conflict are integral to domestic legitimacy (witness the two wars in Chechnya).
What I find most interesting aspect of Crimea is the performative nature of the incursion. At first, soldiers operated without insignia and, ipso facto, unofficially. Yet now that they have been surprisingly unmasked as Russian forces, their presence enables the new Crimean authorities to perform the constituent actions of any sovereign — a people must be created around which the institutions of government can cluster. This will happen later in March when a referendum is scheduled, after which point the people will have spoken – there will be a constituent holder of sovereignty, screened and vetted by the Russian Federation. Yet after this happens, the performance cannot stop — they will have to begin performing the core functions of government, most of which were done by Ukrainian civil servants and bureaucrats. Practically, public order and policing functions will be outsourced to irregulars, soldiers, and Cossacks. Yet each of these is largely unskilled in doing any actual policing. Furthermore, if they alienate Crimea’s Turkic-speaking Tatar population, who collectively have a far worse victimization at the hands of Russia than perhaps any other constituency in Ukraine, Turkey might get involved. One only needs to look at the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus to understand that the Russians are by no means the only ones capable of playing the separatist card.
Ukraine is a country of over 45 million people. It has a long history of being oppressed by outsiders. It will not go down easily (listen to its national anthem if you have any doubts). Trotsky’s thoughts on Ukraine are perhaps more relevant than many of the talking heads dominating the airwaves now (Trotsky on ‘The Ukrainian Question’ in Socialist Appeal, 22 April 1939):
The Ukrainian question, which many governments and many “socialists” and even “communists” have tried to forget or to relegate to the deep strongbox of history, has once again been placed on the order of the day and this time with redoubled force…. We are dealing with a people that has proved its viability, that is numerically equal to the population of France and occupies an exceptionally rich territory which, moreover, is of the highest strategical importance. The question of the fate of the Ukraine has been posed in its full scope. A clear and definite slogan is necessary that corresponds to the new situation. In my opinion there can be at the present time only one such slogan: A united, free and independent workers’ and peasants’ Soviet Ukraine.
Saturday, March 1, 2014
Post-Soviet separatism (again)
I am no expert on Ukraine, or on the Crimea, but I have spent a significant amount of time in another separatist state, Transnistria (PMR). There are quite a few parallels, and although my first instinct was to brush off the initial events in the Crimea as occurring for a show, the past few days have left me with an ominous sense of dread.
As was the case in Transnistria, Russia has vocally spoken of protecting its citizens in the Crimea. This takes the form of the rapid issuance of Russian passports. This has already occurred in the Crimea, and in particular, reports indicate that the Russian consulate in Simferopol has been giving Russian passports to Berkut police officials. Next, Russian military forces will vaguely intervene (i.e., patrol alongside local irregulars, Cossack forces, agitators). Due to the buildup of these foreign forces, the de jure state will be provoked into responding (as was the case in Georgia and Moldova) which will in turn bring down the full force and fury of the Russian army. The particulars are not important, what is important is that a response occurs, and this entails at least some small degree of bloodshed.
The rhetoric is the same -- this is a Russian city/Russian land, we are Russians -- which arises in response to an enemy that is allegedly fascist in nature (in Transnistria, this took the form of a demonization of Moldovans and the Moldovan state as Romanian fascists intent on turning Transnistria back into a bloody WWII era concentration camp), in Crimea the Maidan activists become fascists intent of unleashing pogroms against ethnic Russians.
Ukraine is a lot larger and arguably more important than Georgia. I can't see this escalation ending well for either side. Any attempt to install Yanukovych under a Russian-dominated military rule would be doomed to fail. On the other hand, the Ukrainian economy is on the brink of default, and Russia shows no signs of relenting. I think more than anything these recent events show the insecurity of Putin as a leader.
The power of Ukraine now is not that it might be divided, invaded, federalized, or all of the above -- it shows how, rightly or wrongly, the people can and will take matters into their own hands. Ukrainians, both Russian and Ukrainian speakers, can now see Russia for the punitive bully that it is. The key to creating a separatist polity is in keeping the de jure political forces at bay. This already seems well under way in Ukraine.
Crimeans might want to think long and hard about what a Russian occupation might bring, given that its economy is almost exclusively based on tourism. But then again, Russian tourists seem to enjoy warzones.
Or they can always to go Sochi.
As was the case in Transnistria, Russia has vocally spoken of protecting its citizens in the Crimea. This takes the form of the rapid issuance of Russian passports. This has already occurred in the Crimea, and in particular, reports indicate that the Russian consulate in Simferopol has been giving Russian passports to Berkut police officials. Next, Russian military forces will vaguely intervene (i.e., patrol alongside local irregulars, Cossack forces, agitators). Due to the buildup of these foreign forces, the de jure state will be provoked into responding (as was the case in Georgia and Moldova) which will in turn bring down the full force and fury of the Russian army. The particulars are not important, what is important is that a response occurs, and this entails at least some small degree of bloodshed.
The rhetoric is the same -- this is a Russian city/Russian land, we are Russians -- which arises in response to an enemy that is allegedly fascist in nature (in Transnistria, this took the form of a demonization of Moldovans and the Moldovan state as Romanian fascists intent on turning Transnistria back into a bloody WWII era concentration camp), in Crimea the Maidan activists become fascists intent of unleashing pogroms against ethnic Russians.
Ukraine is a lot larger and arguably more important than Georgia. I can't see this escalation ending well for either side. Any attempt to install Yanukovych under a Russian-dominated military rule would be doomed to fail. On the other hand, the Ukrainian economy is on the brink of default, and Russia shows no signs of relenting. I think more than anything these recent events show the insecurity of Putin as a leader.
The power of Ukraine now is not that it might be divided, invaded, federalized, or all of the above -- it shows how, rightly or wrongly, the people can and will take matters into their own hands. Ukrainians, both Russian and Ukrainian speakers, can now see Russia for the punitive bully that it is. The key to creating a separatist polity is in keeping the de jure political forces at bay. This already seems well under way in Ukraine.
Crimeans might want to think long and hard about what a Russian occupation might bring, given that its economy is almost exclusively based on tourism. But then again, Russian tourists seem to enjoy warzones.
Or they can always to go Sochi.
Saturday, October 30, 2010
Bending the Truth
Bending the Truth
by Michael Bobick
TRANSITIONS ONLINE
28 October 2010
A newly translated account of life in a Transdniestrian town tramples the line between nonfiction and salacious yarn.
Siberian Education: A Shocking Exposé of an Extraordinary Criminal Underworld, by Nicolai Lilin, translated by Jonathan Hunt. Canongate Books, 2010.
BENDER, Moldova | Outsized allegations of crime and weapons trafficking have plagued Transdniester throughout its short history.
A European Parliament delegation to Moldova designated Transdniester a “black hole” in 2002, but even before that, the region was linked in the Western mind to organized crime and the smuggling of arms, humans, cigarettes, and assorted contraband
Perhaps we should say not only in the Western mind anymore.
In Siberian Education, Nicolai Lilin, one of Transdniester’s own, declares his project to chronicle the world of the underground in the town of Bender, which sits on the border between the breakaway region and Moldova proper. In a recent interview with the French online magazine Mediapart, he said, “They [Transdniestrian officials] sell drugs, they sell weapons, they traffic prostitutes. … They work with pedophilia societies in Europe. It’s a dangerous situation inside. If you talk about it, you die. It’s impossible to live inside of this state because it’s a criminal state. I’m talking about it here in Europe because I prefer that Europeans know what happens, because Transdniester is not far away, it’s very near.”
Nicolai LilinThe work is ostensibly a memoir of his youth among the urkas, Siberian criminals – not an ethnic group, as Lilin claims – who came to Transdniester in the 1930s. The author creates the character of Kolima to represent himself and includes a disclaimer that “certain episodes are imaginative recreation.” Readers who know Transdniester, and Bender, are likely to think that true of more than “certain episodes.”
Originally skilled robbers even before the Russians settled Siberia, the urkas were, according to Lilin, deported to Transdniester by Stalin in the 1930s at the height of the purges. History tells another story, however, since from 1918 until 1940 Bender was not part of the Soviet Union, but part of Romania.
After World War II, Transdniester attracted people from around the Soviet Union, of which it was now a part, to work in the region’s busy factories. And far from being a haven for the Soviet Union’s criminals, the region drew servicemen who sought to retire in one of the more temperate regions of the union. The descendants of these settlers today populate the region and remain the core constituents of the Transdniestrian state.
Lilin sets his tale in Bender’s Low River district, not that that matters much, given how stripped of context and chronology the book is. An impoverished region of Europe’s poorest country, Transdniester is fertile ground for social commentary, much like London was for Charles Dickens and New York was for Brett Easton Ellis. But this is not that commentary.
Instead, Siberian Education feels like a compendium of the dark fantasies that Westerners have about Transdniester as a place where people are left to fend for themselves or establish their own law. The reader is led to believe that the laws of the Siberian urkas are but one set of these surrogate forms of authority that exist in the black hole of Europe. It is a laughable portrayal.
For one, Lilin reverses the fortunes of Bender and Tiraspol, positing the quiet, clean Bender as a hive of criminality while Tiraspol, filled with workers and soldiers, is the place where people kept out of crime:
Tiraspol is the capital of Transdniester; it is about 20 kilometers away, on the opposite side of the river. It is a much larger town than ours, and very different. The people of Tiraspol kept out of crime; there were a lot of munitions factories, military barracks, and various offices, so the inhabitants were all workers or soldiers. We had a very bad relationship with the kids of that town; we called them ‘mamas’ boys,’ ‘billy goats,’ and ‘ball-less wonders.’
Bender, on the other hand, is the home of legendary criminals like Plum, the son of a scientist and a literature professor from Moscow State University. After his parents were arrested as enemies of the people in the 1930s, Plum found himself in the notorious gulag of Vorkuta. After the deaths of his father, mother, and sister, Plum was left to fend for himself. He ingratiated himself with the old, established criminal kingpins in the gulag and eventually became their executioner, practicing his trade both in prison and on the outside. A prolific killer of police officers, Plum had amassed a death toll of 12,000. In the book the collection of bloody badges inspires awe in Kolima. To amass such a death toll, Plum would have had to have killed one police officer a day for nearly 33 years. "He remembered everything about each man with total precision," carefully noting their names and the details of their deaths in a notebook, Lilin/Kolima tells us.
A banner celebrates 'All Our Victories' from 65 years ago in World War II to the conflict 20 years ago that won Transdniester its breakaway status.
But while the book purports to be a “shocking expose” of a criminal underworld, it avoids discussion of the very real criminal rackets operating in Transdniester in the 1990s. Crime in Transdniester is not a forbidden topic. Residents speak freely about the likhie devianostye, the crazy 1990s, and readily describe the spectacular shootouts and assassinations that occurred as power and authority was consolidated.
Nor does the book give away much about its protagonist. The reader gets only the faintest outline of the author through his violent exploits and subsequent confinement in juvenile detention facilities. During one of the more revealing episodes, a criminal named Rope asks if Kolima is indeed the famous “writer,” slang for someone skilled at using a knife. Kolima, it turns out, is also a “stinger,” skilled at tattooing (the book jacket says that Lilin works as a tattooist). The book’s sadistic violence and torture and obsession with sex (the last third of the book is devoted to avenging the rape of a local girl) clearly marks it as chernukha, a genre known for its naturalistic depictions of bodily functions, sexuality, and sadistic violence set amid a backdrop of poverty, broken families, and cynicism.
‘NO FUTURE HERE’
Most residents of Bender would not recognize the city portrayed by Lilin. Despite the destruction of much of the city in 1992, today Bender remains cleaner and more orderly than Tiraspol.
Visitors to the region come expecting to find Beirut or the Soviet Union, but end up with a wallet lightened by a hefty “registration fee” and stories to tell. Those adventurous enough to spend some time in Transdniester find a provincial region with the same social and economic problems that exist across the former Soviet Union.
Sasha, a native of Bender in his mid-20s, took me on a late-afternoon stroll one cold September day. As we made our way past the local House of Culture (located on the street where Lilin is said to have lived), we walked to the riverbank, with its Soviet monuments and neat promenade. Looking downriver, Sasha gestured toward the sunken ships, the abandoned barges, and the decrepit port that dominated our view. "There’s no future here, nothing will ever change," he said glumly. A massive banner hangs on the abandoned port and explicitly connects the 65th anniversary of the Great Patriotic War with Transdniester’s 20th anniversary, celebrated on 2 September: “All Our Victories!”
The prison that plays a central role in the book still stands, a short walk from the Low River neighborhood. A large structure shrouded by trees, the prison has a reputation for being Transdniester’s finest, a place where the moneyed do their time. Punishments, like much else in Transdniester, are negotiable.
A few hundred meters from the prison is a neighborhood called the “local Rublevka,” a reference to the prestigious residential area west of Moscow. This is where, according to locals, police officers and civil servants built their houses. As we walked past these houses, Sasha said they were far beyond the means of most residents, whose monthly salaries average between $75 and $150. I was reminded of what a friend once told me about the Transdniestrian conflict – that it would never be solved, since there were no incentives to change. Moldova uses Transdniester as a scapegoat for its lack of development, and Transdniester blames Moldova for any problems in the region.
Lilin is no exception, having forsaken his criminal upbringing in favor of a successful literary career in which he peddles Westerners their own deepest, darkest fears about Transdniester and Russia. Astutely aware of the region's outsized reputation, Lilin has found a literary niche, a captive audience uninterested in the facts.
It’s been a profitable angle: a film version of the book is set to appear in 2011. In the Mediapart interview, Lilin said that he is wanted in Transdniester for defamation. The seasoned criminal, born and raised as a true urka, is now the literary outlaw, wanted not for robbery or murder but for literary crimes. Let's hope that Lilin saved some of his hard-earned money to ensure a favorable outcome should he ever face trial in his homeland.
Story and homepage photo by Michael Bobick, a doctoral candidate in cultural anthropology at Cornell University who is writing a dissertation based on field research conducted in Transdniester.
Monday, October 4, 2010
In Transdniester, One Company Is a Law Unto Itself
Twenty years after breaking away from Moldova, Transdniester remains unrecognized and largely forgotten. One local company has profited hugely from this largely self-imposed isolation.
by Michael Bobick 30 September 2010
TIRASPOL, Transdniester | Ludmila Pavlovna vividly remembers exactly when and why she participated in the strike campaigns that led to Transdniester's disengagement from Moldova. In the waning days of the Soviet Union, the idea was not to create their own republic but to preserve the Soviet Union. It was Moldova, not Transdniester, that wanted to secede from the Soviet Union: Transdniestrians voted in a referendum to preserve it.
Twenty years later, Pavlovna, a pensioner living in Tiraspol, remains convinced that life in Tiraspol, the capital of the unrecognized republic, is better than life in Moldova. Gasoline, natural gas, utilities, rents, and bread are all cheaper than in Moldova. More importantly, pensions are higher. For pensioners on a fixed income (approximately 140,000 of Transdniester's 400,000 to 500,000 residents are pensioners) every kopeck counts.
The 2nd of September marked 20 years since the region declared its independence. Originally the region’s political disengagement was a reaction to Moldovan nationalism, which threatened the cohesion of the region’s largely multiethnic population. In August 1989 Moldova passed a language law that made Moldovan the sole official language of the republic. These early assertions of cultural and linguistic rights were viewed from industrialized, Russian-speaking Transdniester as the first steps in an eventual unification with Romania. Gradually, through a series of referendums, Transdniestrians voted first to create a separate Soviet republic, and then in March 1991, they voted in favor of preserving the Soviet Union, according to then-Soviet officials, although the unionwide referendum was officially shunned by Chisinau.
Since the brief civil war in 1992, the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic has taken on many of the attributes of a state, having its own currency, military, police, state symbols, borders, and passports. Despite its de facto sovereignty, the republic lacks international recognition.
Allegations and rumors of smuggling and contraband have plagued the region since its armed conflict with Moldova ended in 1992. But while outside opinion of Transdniester is often condensed into fear of organized crime and Russian influence, its development, particularly the local contours of privatization and capital consolidation, remains largely unexplored.
Following the civil war, the informal economy initially proved to be a resource to many in the region. From the earliest shuttle traders who bought cheap goods, alcohol, and cigarettes in Odessa for resale, to the bustling trade in scrap metal, Transdniester’s economy has run principally on the basis of the goods that pass over the porous border with Ukraine and how authorities control subsequent economic activity. Imports include the raw materials needed for local enterprises, consumer goods to be resold locally and beyond, and high-value imports (devoid of customs stamps) like alcohol and cigarettes. The region's exports include finished goods, locally produced spirits, food products, and re-exported goods.
The isolationist policies of the Tiraspol authorities have allowed a few companies to monopolize what profitable economic outlets exist. Above all, the Sheriff holding company has forged an unchallenged monopoly. The links between business and politics in Sheriff are, paradoxically, clear yet opaque. Whenever the subject comes up in conversation, Transdniestrian residents take for granted that Sheriff has prospered from its close connections with politics. It is widely believed that Sheriff purchased assets in privatization auctions for a pittance and that the company pays little to no taxes on either profits or imports.
Sheriff store
Sheriff also provides charity, giving pensioners a 7 percent discount on the first thousand Transdniestrian rubles they spend in Sheriff stores per month (the maximum discount comes out to $7 per month, at the current exchange rate). It is not uncommon to see pensioners standing in line, discount cards in hand, waiting to purchase a single loaf of bread.
Sheriff was formed as a limited liability company in 1993 by Viktor Gushan and Ilya Kazmaly, two former special forces officers. It functions as a holding company, employing nearly 3,000 workers in its own companies and another 12,000 in its holding companies. It releases no public financial statements, and reliable information about the company is rare. Sheriff’s website portrays the group’s astronomical success as the result of hard work and innovation not its near monopoly on retail and wholesale trade.
Pavlovna shops at Sheriff because, she says, there is no other way. While more expensive than other stores, the local Sheriff store is more conveniently located for her. The pensioner discount keeps her returning each month. For $7 per month, Sheriff ensures that pensioners spend the majority of their pensions at their supermarkets. Discounts are not limited to pensioners. If customers use the Raduga (Rainbow) card – offered through Sheriff’s Agroprombank – they receive a 3 percent discount. Employees of Sheriff-owned companies can choose to receive their pay on their Raduga card. Sheriff is the modern day-equivalent of the truck system or company store of the 18th and 19th century that kept workers in debt, only it offers not debt but an array of choices and goods unavailable elsewhere.
Sheriff’s pristine supermarkets and shelves are full of imported Western-style products, some of questionable provenance. On more than one occasion in Sheriff I noticed Marlboro cigarettes marked duty-free North Africa as well as other “duty-free” cigarettes from the Philippines, Dubai, the UAE, and beyond. Sheriff’s expanded consumer offerings are appreciated by many Transdniestrians. Sergei Vasilievich, another pensioner, said he felt like a civilized person shopping in Sheriff, not having to ask the salesperson for each item he wanted to inspect as in the old Soviet-era shops. Of course, there are drawbacks. Prices often are higher and products sometimes inferior. Pavlovna insists that the sugar sold in Sheriff is simply not as sweet as Ukrainian, Moldovan, or Russian sugar.
Despite Vladimir Putin allegedly calling Transdniester "the Republic of Sheriff," and the company's deep roots with local leaders, Sheriff should be seen more as a symptom of Transdniester's unresolved status than as a cause. Any discussion of economics and politics in the region will eventually lead to the subject of Sheriff. In the 1990s, the company began taking over the booming cigarette business, long a favorite of smugglers in Europe. Gradually Sheriff took over any other informal business that generated significant income (liquor, frozen chicken legs, gasoline, etc.), often using the violent “gangster capitalism” tactics prevalent throughout the post-Soviet region in the 1990s to do so, allegedly racking up dozens of economically motivated killings along the way.
Formed by police officers, the company was essentially untouchable. Who actually stands behind Sheriff remains a mystery; Gushan and Kazmaly are well-known figures, but it is unclear whether they exercise control or are straw men.
The number of businesses controlled by Sheriff is large and covers a wide variety of industries. Sheriff has a network of supermarkets, automobile service stations, construction firms, and Moldova’s most successful football club. Sheriff Tiraspol plays its games in a massive training complex with two full-sized stadiums, five training fields, an indoor arena, a football academy, and housing for FC Sheriff players. It is the only FIFA certified stadium in Moldova, which ironically forces the Moldovan national team to play its games in the Transdniestrian capital. Further, in addition, it owns the only telephone, mobile phone, and Internet service provider. Other businesses that Sheriff has interests in (directly or indirectly) include textiles, broadcast and cable television, auto sales, publishing, distilling (Tiraspol’s famous KVINT cognac), food producers, second-hand clothing, and advertising. The odds are that any given factory or building site you pass here is owned by Sheriff.
It should be noted that the region's most valuable assets, including the MMZ steel factory, two power plants, and the electricity grid, remain in Russian hands.
Things are changing in Transdniester, as Russia no longer unconditionally supports the regime. Until a few months ago, pensioners received additional Russian “humanitarian aid” each month in the form of pension supplements to the tune of $15 a month. Each month, the pension coupon clearly specified how much of the payment came from the Transdniestrian budget and how much from Russia. Moldova views these pension supplements as tacit support for separatism, a charge denied by politicians in Transdniester. More recently, Russia has suspended its aid payments until their distribution methods could be refined and an independent audit conducted. Meanwhile, President Igor Smirnov has been forced to pay the supplements with natural gas utility fees – these utility receipts have traditionally been used by the authorities for discretionary spending (the money is deposited in a bank connected to the president’s younger son, Oleg), notwithstanding the fact that the region’s debt to Gazprom for unpaid bills and penalties is well over $2 billion.
Living in Transdniester has other benefits. Consumers pay cheaper rates for electricity, gas, and communal services utilities in Transdniester. Such discrepancies further differentiate the local, majority Russian-speaking population from Moldova. The economic differentiation is a very real complement to the linguistic differentiation that contributed to the dispute. Cheap natural gas indirectly subsidizes industries like bread making, while the porous border and large informal economy keep Sheriff supermarkets stocked with cheap foodstuffs.
On Sheriff's website, the company boasts that it eliminates the middleman, like Wal-Mart, and works directly with producers, thus offering lower prices. While this may be true, the fact that Moldovan goods are taxed at 100 percent in Transdniester helps the company further stifle competition with Moldovan products, while its monopoly on wholesale in the republic eliminates competition from would-be small businesses. Sheriff's distribution system affords a unique view of how the economy of an unrecognized country works. The Transdniestrian customs committee is run by the president's elder son, Vladimir, and the railroad is alleged to be controlled from within the executive branch. From the time goods cross the border until they arrive at Sheriff stores, the company’s business is facilitated by close relations with the executive branch.
Sheriff has created a diffuse economic structure that blurs the line between business and politics. On paper, it is a holding company. Yet in reality, Sheriff is a company that has profited from close relations with state officials. Its low tax burden, its provision of social goods through widely publicized charity programs for pensioners, and its ubiquitous corporate logo (an old-West sheriff's badge) lend it an aura of invincibility and quasi-governmental status. More than once I was told that the irony of a company positioning itself as the "sheriff" of an unrecognized country was not lost on its founders. After all, they said, citing the numerous Italian and American westerns shown on local television, "Who is the sheriff if not the chief authority in town?"
Michael Bobick is a doctoral candidate in cultural anthropology at Cornell University and is writing a dissertation based on field research conducted in Transdniester.
Twenty years after breaking away from Moldova, Transdniester remains unrecognized and largely forgotten. One local company has profited hugely from this largely self-imposed isolation.
by Michael Bobick 30 September 2010
TIRASPOL, Transdniester | Ludmila Pavlovna vividly remembers exactly when and why she participated in the strike campaigns that led to Transdniester's disengagement from Moldova. In the waning days of the Soviet Union, the idea was not to create their own republic but to preserve the Soviet Union. It was Moldova, not Transdniester, that wanted to secede from the Soviet Union: Transdniestrians voted in a referendum to preserve it.
Twenty years later, Pavlovna, a pensioner living in Tiraspol, remains convinced that life in Tiraspol, the capital of the unrecognized republic, is better than life in Moldova. Gasoline, natural gas, utilities, rents, and bread are all cheaper than in Moldova. More importantly, pensions are higher. For pensioners on a fixed income (approximately 140,000 of Transdniester's 400,000 to 500,000 residents are pensioners) every kopeck counts.
The 2nd of September marked 20 years since the region declared its independence. Originally the region’s political disengagement was a reaction to Moldovan nationalism, which threatened the cohesion of the region’s largely multiethnic population. In August 1989 Moldova passed a language law that made Moldovan the sole official language of the republic. These early assertions of cultural and linguistic rights were viewed from industrialized, Russian-speaking Transdniester as the first steps in an eventual unification with Romania. Gradually, through a series of referendums, Transdniestrians voted first to create a separate Soviet republic, and then in March 1991, they voted in favor of preserving the Soviet Union, according to then-Soviet officials, although the unionwide referendum was officially shunned by Chisinau.
Since the brief civil war in 1992, the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic has taken on many of the attributes of a state, having its own currency, military, police, state symbols, borders, and passports. Despite its de facto sovereignty, the republic lacks international recognition.
Allegations and rumors of smuggling and contraband have plagued the region since its armed conflict with Moldova ended in 1992. But while outside opinion of Transdniester is often condensed into fear of organized crime and Russian influence, its development, particularly the local contours of privatization and capital consolidation, remains largely unexplored.
Following the civil war, the informal economy initially proved to be a resource to many in the region. From the earliest shuttle traders who bought cheap goods, alcohol, and cigarettes in Odessa for resale, to the bustling trade in scrap metal, Transdniester’s economy has run principally on the basis of the goods that pass over the porous border with Ukraine and how authorities control subsequent economic activity. Imports include the raw materials needed for local enterprises, consumer goods to be resold locally and beyond, and high-value imports (devoid of customs stamps) like alcohol and cigarettes. The region's exports include finished goods, locally produced spirits, food products, and re-exported goods.
The isolationist policies of the Tiraspol authorities have allowed a few companies to monopolize what profitable economic outlets exist. Above all, the Sheriff holding company has forged an unchallenged monopoly. The links between business and politics in Sheriff are, paradoxically, clear yet opaque. Whenever the subject comes up in conversation, Transdniestrian residents take for granted that Sheriff has prospered from its close connections with politics. It is widely believed that Sheriff purchased assets in privatization auctions for a pittance and that the company pays little to no taxes on either profits or imports.
Sheriff store
Sheriff also provides charity, giving pensioners a 7 percent discount on the first thousand Transdniestrian rubles they spend in Sheriff stores per month (the maximum discount comes out to $7 per month, at the current exchange rate). It is not uncommon to see pensioners standing in line, discount cards in hand, waiting to purchase a single loaf of bread.
Sheriff was formed as a limited liability company in 1993 by Viktor Gushan and Ilya Kazmaly, two former special forces officers. It functions as a holding company, employing nearly 3,000 workers in its own companies and another 12,000 in its holding companies. It releases no public financial statements, and reliable information about the company is rare. Sheriff’s website portrays the group’s astronomical success as the result of hard work and innovation not its near monopoly on retail and wholesale trade.
Pavlovna shops at Sheriff because, she says, there is no other way. While more expensive than other stores, the local Sheriff store is more conveniently located for her. The pensioner discount keeps her returning each month. For $7 per month, Sheriff ensures that pensioners spend the majority of their pensions at their supermarkets. Discounts are not limited to pensioners. If customers use the Raduga (Rainbow) card – offered through Sheriff’s Agroprombank – they receive a 3 percent discount. Employees of Sheriff-owned companies can choose to receive their pay on their Raduga card. Sheriff is the modern day-equivalent of the truck system or company store of the 18th and 19th century that kept workers in debt, only it offers not debt but an array of choices and goods unavailable elsewhere.
Sheriff’s pristine supermarkets and shelves are full of imported Western-style products, some of questionable provenance. On more than one occasion in Sheriff I noticed Marlboro cigarettes marked duty-free North Africa as well as other “duty-free” cigarettes from the Philippines, Dubai, the UAE, and beyond. Sheriff’s expanded consumer offerings are appreciated by many Transdniestrians. Sergei Vasilievich, another pensioner, said he felt like a civilized person shopping in Sheriff, not having to ask the salesperson for each item he wanted to inspect as in the old Soviet-era shops. Of course, there are drawbacks. Prices often are higher and products sometimes inferior. Pavlovna insists that the sugar sold in Sheriff is simply not as sweet as Ukrainian, Moldovan, or Russian sugar.
Despite Vladimir Putin allegedly calling Transdniester "the Republic of Sheriff," and the company's deep roots with local leaders, Sheriff should be seen more as a symptom of Transdniester's unresolved status than as a cause. Any discussion of economics and politics in the region will eventually lead to the subject of Sheriff. In the 1990s, the company began taking over the booming cigarette business, long a favorite of smugglers in Europe. Gradually Sheriff took over any other informal business that generated significant income (liquor, frozen chicken legs, gasoline, etc.), often using the violent “gangster capitalism” tactics prevalent throughout the post-Soviet region in the 1990s to do so, allegedly racking up dozens of economically motivated killings along the way.
Formed by police officers, the company was essentially untouchable. Who actually stands behind Sheriff remains a mystery; Gushan and Kazmaly are well-known figures, but it is unclear whether they exercise control or are straw men.
The number of businesses controlled by Sheriff is large and covers a wide variety of industries. Sheriff has a network of supermarkets, automobile service stations, construction firms, and Moldova’s most successful football club. Sheriff Tiraspol plays its games in a massive training complex with two full-sized stadiums, five training fields, an indoor arena, a football academy, and housing for FC Sheriff players. It is the only FIFA certified stadium in Moldova, which ironically forces the Moldovan national team to play its games in the Transdniestrian capital. Further, in addition, it owns the only telephone, mobile phone, and Internet service provider. Other businesses that Sheriff has interests in (directly or indirectly) include textiles, broadcast and cable television, auto sales, publishing, distilling (Tiraspol’s famous KVINT cognac), food producers, second-hand clothing, and advertising. The odds are that any given factory or building site you pass here is owned by Sheriff.
It should be noted that the region's most valuable assets, including the MMZ steel factory, two power plants, and the electricity grid, remain in Russian hands.
Things are changing in Transdniester, as Russia no longer unconditionally supports the regime. Until a few months ago, pensioners received additional Russian “humanitarian aid” each month in the form of pension supplements to the tune of $15 a month. Each month, the pension coupon clearly specified how much of the payment came from the Transdniestrian budget and how much from Russia. Moldova views these pension supplements as tacit support for separatism, a charge denied by politicians in Transdniester. More recently, Russia has suspended its aid payments until their distribution methods could be refined and an independent audit conducted. Meanwhile, President Igor Smirnov has been forced to pay the supplements with natural gas utility fees – these utility receipts have traditionally been used by the authorities for discretionary spending (the money is deposited in a bank connected to the president’s younger son, Oleg), notwithstanding the fact that the region’s debt to Gazprom for unpaid bills and penalties is well over $2 billion.
Living in Transdniester has other benefits. Consumers pay cheaper rates for electricity, gas, and communal services utilities in Transdniester. Such discrepancies further differentiate the local, majority Russian-speaking population from Moldova. The economic differentiation is a very real complement to the linguistic differentiation that contributed to the dispute. Cheap natural gas indirectly subsidizes industries like bread making, while the porous border and large informal economy keep Sheriff supermarkets stocked with cheap foodstuffs.
On Sheriff's website, the company boasts that it eliminates the middleman, like Wal-Mart, and works directly with producers, thus offering lower prices. While this may be true, the fact that Moldovan goods are taxed at 100 percent in Transdniester helps the company further stifle competition with Moldovan products, while its monopoly on wholesale in the republic eliminates competition from would-be small businesses. Sheriff's distribution system affords a unique view of how the economy of an unrecognized country works. The Transdniestrian customs committee is run by the president's elder son, Vladimir, and the railroad is alleged to be controlled from within the executive branch. From the time goods cross the border until they arrive at Sheriff stores, the company’s business is facilitated by close relations with the executive branch.
Sheriff has created a diffuse economic structure that blurs the line between business and politics. On paper, it is a holding company. Yet in reality, Sheriff is a company that has profited from close relations with state officials. Its low tax burden, its provision of social goods through widely publicized charity programs for pensioners, and its ubiquitous corporate logo (an old-West sheriff's badge) lend it an aura of invincibility and quasi-governmental status. More than once I was told that the irony of a company positioning itself as the "sheriff" of an unrecognized country was not lost on its founders. After all, they said, citing the numerous Italian and American westerns shown on local television, "Who is the sheriff if not the chief authority in town?"
Michael Bobick is a doctoral candidate in cultural anthropology at Cornell University and is writing a dissertation based on field research conducted in Transdniester.
Monday, March 30, 2009
mr clean...
GOVERNMENT CAN'T FIND TOWN DESERVING TO BE DESIGNATED AS THE MOST MODERN, CLEAN AND WELL-EQUIPPED
Chisinau, March 23 ( INFOTAG ). On Monday the Government summed up the results of the contest "The Most Modern, Clean and Well-equipped Locality in 2008".
According to the National Contest Commission's decision, it was decided not to award any premium in the I group (municipalities and towns, where the population number exceeds 20 thousand people). Anenii Noi, Singerei and Glodeni were recognized as winners among the raion centers and they will receive premiums in the amount of 60 thousand lei each.
In the III group (villages) premiums in the amount of 40 thousand lei will be handed to the Tetcani village of the Briceni raion, Oxentia of the Dubasari raion and Braviceni of the Orhei raion.
The Porumbeni village of the Cimislia raion and the Pocrovca village of the Dubasari village received encouraging premiums in the amount of 20 thousand lei each.
Diplomas will be handed to the towns of Floresti, Ciadir-Lunga, Costiujenii Mari community of the Soldanesti raion and the Sadovoe village of the Balti municipality.
The expenditures on premiums for localities will be covered at the cost of the National Ecological Fund. Financial resources will be transferred to the treasury accounts of the Mayor's offices "for implementing improvement works.
Chisinau, March 23 ( INFOTAG ). On Monday the Government summed up the results of the contest "The Most Modern, Clean and Well-equipped Locality in 2008".
According to the National Contest Commission's decision, it was decided not to award any premium in the I group (municipalities and towns, where the population number exceeds 20 thousand people). Anenii Noi, Singerei and Glodeni were recognized as winners among the raion centers and they will receive premiums in the amount of 60 thousand lei each.
In the III group (villages) premiums in the amount of 40 thousand lei will be handed to the Tetcani village of the Briceni raion, Oxentia of the Dubasari raion and Braviceni of the Orhei raion.
The Porumbeni village of the Cimislia raion and the Pocrovca village of the Dubasari village received encouraging premiums in the amount of 20 thousand lei each.
Diplomas will be handed to the towns of Floresti, Ciadir-Lunga, Costiujenii Mari community of the Soldanesti raion and the Sadovoe village of the Balti municipality.
The expenditures on premiums for localities will be covered at the cost of the National Ecological Fund. Financial resources will be transferred to the treasury accounts of the Mayor's offices "for implementing improvement works.
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